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1. Introduction 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to offer a contribution to the explanation of  
the differences among the various schools of economic history. This will be done 
by placing the development of the discipline within the evolution of Western 
thought and culture of  the last century2.  
Since the nineteen-forties, economic history, still quite a young discipline, 
has been characterized by a rich methodological debate and, at times, by harsh 
controversies. These saw, on the one side, the supporters of rigorously scientific 
research programs with precise and explicit analytic boundaries, a problem-solving 
approach and the use of tools and methods borrowed from economics; on the 
other, those championing a hermeneutic approach and  ‘humanistic’ conception of 
economic history whereby a comprehensive vision of history prevails and the 
analysis of specific (economic) aspects is only conceived as part of the whole. The 
first position has been distinctive mostly of the American school, the second largely 
of the continental schools, with the British one (and the Polish and the 
Scandinavian) somehow in between. 
More specifically, an analysis of the connections between economic history 
and contemporary epistemology will be carried out. In this perspective an analogy 
with the traditional division between analytic philosophy and continental 
philosophy would appear to be useful for economic history too: the first had long 
prevailed in Anglo-Saxon, the second in continental, culture. This partition evokes 
and embraces the antithesis between scientific and humanist culture, between logic 
and rhetoric, analysis and interpretation, conceptual clarification and visions of the 
world. The paper will thus try to verify whether the opposition that loomed large 
over the post W.W.II decades between Anglo-American and European economic 
histories can also be conceived as a specific form of the wider opposition between  
‘analytic style’ and ‘continental style’. 
This is only one of the possible keys to approaching the history of 
economics, of course. Other factors, possibly even more determining, have 
influenced its destiny on both sides of the Atlantic, factors that have often had a 
more mundane nature and less noble aims: access to research funds, desire for 
prestige and academic power, conflicts between schools - by no means insignificant 
issues in academic sociology, which we must restrict to a few rapid references.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I will try to show 
briefly how - before 1940 - no definite approach had yet emerged in economic 
history.  In the third section, the origins of the dichotomy between continental and 
analytic styles is traced along epistemological lines, while the fourth is devoted to 
the question of the different analytic languages that might explain the differing 
results obtained by the same approach in the U.K. and U.S;   the fifth makes a brief 
incursion into business history; the sixth introduces the theme of the crisis of the 
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neo-empirical model and discusses its consequences on the discipline; the seventh 
briefly tackles matters of academic economics and sociology. Finally, a few words 
of conclusion will round off the paper. 
 
 
2. Economic history at its beginning: methodological problems and 
approaches 
 
  In 1987 a distinguished proponent of the scientific approach to economic 
history -  ‘cliometrics’ or, as he herself suggests, ‘historical economics’ – observed 
that the methodenstreit of the early years between new (scientific) and old (traditional) 
economic histories had come to an end. Any ‘highbrow’  (i.e. philosophical and 
theoretical) issue had shown itself to be ‘fruitless’ and ‘irrelevant’ viz. practical ones 
such as the scientific achievements and proliferation of the ‘new discipline’ 
(McCloskey 1987: 16-18). Still, there is a question – «all good history has a 
question», to quote Deirdre McCloskey again – the answer to which may require a 
few ‘highbrow’ reflections. Why, since the  Fifties, has economic history, in spite of 
having quite a homogenous matrix, split in two clearly diverging branches, one 
almost exclusively pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon world, the other to the European 
(continental) one?  
       Economic history may be seen as the youngest of the social sciences. It would 
certainly appear to be so, at least from the point of view of autonomy and subject 
specialization - that is formal independence of other branches of knowledge, and 
acknowledgment of academic dignity – traits that can be traced back mainly to the 
inter-war years.  At the same time, there is almost unanimous consent in tracing 
some of its real origins back to the inductive approach and thematic strongly 
associated with the economists of the German historical school.  
  It was in particular from some exponents of the second generation (the so-
called ‘young’ historians) and certainly from Gustav Schmoller that the proposal 
came to re-establish economics on a historical and institutional basis, in a clean 
break with the then dominant abstractions of the classical and marginalist school.  
However, if «the historical method, applied to economic studies, seems largely to 
have failed » (Gras 1920:210), its failure was offset by the opening up of a new 
discipline, that is Economic History. This in fact, in its early decades of life, in 
Europe as in America, grew up under the influence of the German school (Scott 
1928, Gras 1942) and therefore in the conviction that the abstractions of economic 
theory were of little use to a study of history (Ashley 1893:127). 
  Some decades would pass before economic history was freed from the 
excesses of the inductivism that had marked its origins, and before it addressed in a 
more balanced, less polemical way the question of the relationship between fact 
and theory. Of course, the problem would not disappear completely and has 
surfaced again and again, right up to the present, as the methodological crux of the 
  3 
discipline. In the inter-war years a compromise did seem to have been reached, 
making it possible to celebrate the union between History and Economics, but it 
was still a vague compromise at a methodological level. William Ashley’s tardy 
recognition of a sort of rediscovered harmony between the two disciplines (Ashley 
1927)  appeared essentially driven  by a desire for academic recognition of the 
discipline, which was slow in coming3. It was therefore a compromise more 
apparent than real, and it concealed a plurality of positions and wealth of initiatives 
(e.g. publishing) which certainly did not have a single character4. 
     If we observe the evolution of the discipline in countries like France, Germany 
or the United States, we can see emerging in the inter-war period many different 
lines of research, which seem to have had little in common except scant sensitivity 
to the question of conceptualization. Yet they were extremely productive economic 
historiographies, attracting attention for their descriptive accounts, large number of 
facts (sometimes massed together without any logical criteria other than post hoc ergo 
propter hoc) and minutely detailed reconstructions. All this work was based on 
incessant recourse to archives in the two European countries and, where the 
United States was concerned - due to the obviously limited availability of historical 
sources - to copious statistical documentation produced since the early 1800s by 
the Census Bureau  (Sèe 1927, Gras 1927, Brodnitz 1927).  It is no coincidence that 
in the States the history of economics made its impact in close association with the 
history of enterprise, a field of study developed early on, partly thanks to the huge 
amount of business archives available5. To some extent, then, the scarce concern 
for conceptualization can be explained by the relative lack of absorption by French, 
German and American culture of British-style economic theory6.  
       Yet in France and Germany, as well as in the United States, the calm waters of 
‘the traditional’ approach were being churned up by innovating research programs 
and stimulating methodological proposals, though not always pointing in the same 
direction.  In France, for example, Lucien Febvre and March Bloch, continuing the 
tradition of the Revue de synthèse7 created with the Annales a ‘global’ history program 
that set out «to establish a kind of hegemony of History over the other human 
                                                  
3 Not by chance the program of the new “Economic History Society” (1926) –the first president of which was 
Ashley – did have just a practical trait, without any reference to methodological or theoretical issues, being finalized 
just to the promotion and diffusion of economic history (Economic Journal, 1926:322-3). 
4 See f.i. the diverging remarks of Clapham (1922a and 1922b), Pigou (1922) and Hecksher (1929). 
5 As shown by the appointment of Edwin Gay to the position of Dean of the Harvard Business School, and by the 
title of the first, short-lived (1928-1933), periodical devoted to economic history in the U.S., the Journal of Economics 
and Business History 
6 The situation in Germany was obviously connected with the lasting influence of the German Historical School. In 
France, on the contrary, at the turn of the twentieth century marginalism had to compete with the clearly empirical 
line of positivist economics, which with S. Simiand was attempting to combine statistical form and economic 
analysis. In the U.S. then, the branch of political economics prevalent at the beginning of the century 
institutionalism, represented an original native mixture of Peirce-style pragmatism and  Marshallian echoes, but 
paying attention to the social-historical question.  
7 See for instance Bloch 1949, Febvre 1953, Braudel 1969, Aymard 1972, Stoianovich 1978, Burke 1978). On the 
Revue de synthèse, cfr. Gemelli 1978 
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sciences». On the basis of this,  ‘history was given a privileged position, especially 
over Social Psychology and Sociology, and even more over Economics’ (Braudel 
1992:301).  In Germany instead, with Max Weber and Werner Sombart, there was 
an attempt to react against the excessive historicism of the History school8.  In 
particular, the position of Sombart - the search for dynamic models for History  
(Sombart 1929)- would not remain isolated and, though remaining a minor part of 
economic history, would produce some of the most meaningful and long-lasting 
contributions to the discipline, starting from the 1930s, when in the United States 
an economist sui generis like Simon Kuznets, with his dynamic analyses of the 
secular movements of production and prices, independently came to make this 
choice (Kuznets 1930).  
      The panorama of economic history between the two wars thus presented a 
plurality of positions and study lines that were ill suited to defining a precise 
methodological set of rules.  This may help to explain why academic acceptance of 
the discipline was so slow - a problem most rife among historians –making it an 
object of discussion in the pages of the first (for some years only) periodical 
exclusively devoted to economic history, the Economic History Review.9  
 
 
                                                
3. Analytic economic history vs. continental economic history 
 
  From the Forties onwards the plurality of positions and fervor for initiatives 
of the inter-war period on both sides of the Atlantic seemed to concentrate more 
and more around two main methodological protocols. For the moment I will call 
them strong economics protocol, with reference above all to the American schools, 
and weak economics protocol, to which the greater part of the continental schools 
can be ascribed.  Both schools seem to have become aware that it was necessary to 
offer economic history a role and a specific task, so that it could develop as an 
independent discipline.  The problem of the bounds, limits and methods that 
should characterize it, however, was mainly felt by supporters of the first kind of 
protocol, that is within the U.S. Here an important role was played by the creation 
of the American Economic History Association in 1941 - which in that same year 
produced the Journal of Economic History. 
It is meaningful to re-read with the eyes of an American economic historian 
of today the objectives the founders of the first association set themselves, because 
 
8 Sombart proposed that the economic historian, taking advantage of his specific preparation in the two disciplines, 
should attempt to fuse them in an original conceptualization (Sombart 1929). The model Sombart had in mind was 
obviously his own, that of  “modern capitalism”, which with each ensuing edition became more and more complex 
and obscure, to the point of making Einaudi complain of “the waste of so much learning and mental effort” 
(Einaudi 1936: 204). 
9 This, in 1931 featured an inquiry into the teaching of economic history in the universities, producing a picture that 
was by no means encouraging. In most continental Europe countries, chairs devoted expressly to the discipline could 
be counted on the fingers of one (De Mann 1931/2; De Rosa,1990:40 and passim). 
  5 
in this hindsight reinterpretation (with an inevitable forcing meant to anticipate 
what was to follow), it is already possible to read the future of American economic 
history and its landing on the shores of cliometrics: 
 
      «Fifty years ago our founders established the Economic History Association to convert 
economic history from a topic into a discipline.  Looking back, we can see that their objective 
was formidable.  A discipline requires much more than self-identification, mutual recognition and 
a set of by-laws.  A discipline requires standards, a productive skill, and a place in the larger world 
of human endeavors» (Sutch 1991:  272). 
 
     At a first reading of the original interventions presented at the inaugural meeting 
of the Association, held in Princeton in September 1941 and published in the 
supplement of the first annual Journal, the new research program of American 
economic history seems less easy to predict than it actually was10. More than one 
intervention focused on the tasks and methodological rules for economic history, 
in particular on the need for greater quantification and closer links with economic 
theory 11. However what turned out to be really meaningful and revealing was the 
publication in the first number of the review of an article by Simon Kuznets12. In it 
were highlighted the thematic and methodological specificities of the discipline, 
specificities that made necessary the recognition «of the need for more extensive 
use of generalization and analysis in economic history».  In fact the great new 
challenge for the historian was to be considered the search for uniformity in the 
amorphous mass of facts that history proposed:  and this could only be done with 
the guide «of hypotheses and categories evolved by theoretical and statistical 
analysis in the foreground of economic inquiry» (Kuznets 1941:39).  
          Therefore, even if emphasized with hindsight by the cliometric lens of ( 
McCloskey-style)  ‘modernism’, the guidelines for the future path of the newly 
institutionalized discipline can be traced here: a precise set of rules and 
                                                  
10 In particular, in his opening address, John U. Nef – in underlining the risks of “isolation from the rest of 
learning” the newly created association was going towards – said he was convinced that the scant interest recorded 
so far by American economic history for its European equivalent was to be attributed to the fact that the latter was 
mainly the work of scholars of “general culture” and particularly versed in philosophy ( Nef 1941: 6-7). 
11 Particularly those of Edwin Gay (Gay 1941) on the tasks of economic history, and E. A. J. Johnson (Johnson 
1941) on the importance of the use in the discipline of new analytical instruments borrowed from statistics and 
theory. 
12 Kuznets’ contribution to the development of a more rigorous and systematic approach of  economic history 
should actually not be undervalued. A pioneer in  the use of retrospective national income accounts as a tool to study 
economic growth, his interest in the organized comparative study of structural change dated at least as far back as 
1937, when he created the Conference for Research in Income and Wealth, and was able to obtain the financial support of 
the Rockfeller Foundation. His claiming for a conceptual comparative framework to make sense of the large amount 
of historical data created, while creating a tension with his colleagues at the NBER, opened a new research agenda to 
economic historians. Later (1947) he was among the founders of The International Association for r Research in Income and 
Wealth he chaired the Committee on Economic Growth which recruited leading scholars in eleven countries (such as 
P. Deane, J. Marczwesky and J.C.Toutain) to study long-term growth . His emphasis on measurement and 
quantification greatly influenced the first generation of cliometricians, as among his post-graduate students one can 
enumerate champions of the new economic history such as L.Davis, R.Easterlin, R.Gallman, R.Fogel and 
S.Engerman. See e.g. Fogel 2000, de Rouvray 2004, Syrquin 2006. 
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methodological standards, the refining of working techniques and, above all, a 
rigorous identification of the discipline’s boundaries. It was an ambitious and 
innovative program, the realization of which demanded much resort to economic 
theory, in order to identify problems and give them analytic treatment using 
sophisticated quantitative techniques.  This would make it possible to attain 
«professional standards to set its practitioners apart and above charlatans and 
dilettantes» (Sutch 1991:272). 
      On the continent, instead, economic history seems to have found it harder to 
take its place as an independent discipline, clearly identifiable among other fields of 
historical research.  It is obviously impossible here to provide a panorama of all the 
branches and schools of study (a task for which I would be totally unprepared in 
any case).  In the decades on either side of the Second World War, economic 
historiography in Europe was strongly influenced by the studies of E.J. Hamilton, 
whose hypotheses on the impact of the price revolution on the birth of capitalism 
obviously had profound implications for modern history on the continent 
(Hamilton 1928,1929,1934).  The plethora of quantitative studies, often of an 
essentially compilative character, ended by causing increasingly bitter criticism, 
however13. 
The methodological assumption shared by many of the lines taken by 
continental research was  the conviction that it was foolish and artificial even to 
attempt to divide human endeavor into separate compartments.  It followed that 
any rigorously exclusive treatment of the economics question was considered, apart 
from being misleading, meaningless.  Since economic aspects are closely 
interconnected with social, political, cultural and anthropological ones, any study of 
economic history was expected to take this into account.  Paradigmatic of this 
approach was the research program of the Annales, especially in the first two 
generations of historians recognized as belonging to it (from Bloch to Braudel, to 
be exact): as we know, it was characterized by the ambitious attempt to encompass 
the social sciences in a history conceived as ‘total history’, as all-embracing 
knowledge of social reality and its development.   
Albeit with different accents, aims and awareness, many continental schools 
developed similar lines of research: in particular, the various lines of economic and 
social history established in Europe after the Second World War and above all, 
though not only, those of Marxist inspiration (think of the famous Studies in the 
development of capitalism by Maurice Dobb, 1946).  Indeed, the influence of Marxist 
thought on the evolution of economic historiography in Europe must not be 
underrated - an influence much more strongly felt on the old continent than in 
                                                  
13 Even those, like Gino Luzzatto, who had shown themselves more sensitive to the problem of identification and 
delimitation of the discipline, reacted with proposals that were not fully in harmony with the lines previously 
expressed: “Economic history” said Luzzatto in 1951 “ is always and above all the history of mankind, and the field 
of our studies is so vast and varied that it is only on a tiny part of it that full light can be shed with quantitative 
research (Luzzatto 1951: 349). 
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North America14 . In France this contributed not a little to scaling down the 
admittedly promising beginnings15  of a cliometrics school on that side of the Alps 
(Grantham 1997).  In Germany  «the failure of cliometrics to gain many 
converts...despite the strong position of economic history in German universities» 
(Eddie and Gray 1999:1) can be explained by a number of causes,  particularly the 
German historical tradition and the weakness of its econometric school16. In that 
very Britain which would have served as the ‘main bridgehead’ for the diffusion of 
the innovations coming from the new U.S. economic history, the radical tradition 
of social and economic history pointing at the adverse social consequences of 
industrialization had been long prevailing (Mathias, 2006) 
  Why this dichotomy, therefore?  How can we explain the different 
directions taken  by the discipline on opposite sides of the Atlantic?  Is it enough to 
refer to the diverse influence of Marxist though? Or is it due to the different ways 
the economic schools developed?  
There is no easy answer.  Naturally, the two reasons given above are 
important, as is the fact that in order to follow the evolution of economic history, it 
is essential to understand its relationship with the economic theory and micro- and 
macro-economic models from which it has continued to draw inspiration (we will 
return to this point later). However, if we choose this kind of explanation (however 
unsatisfactory), we simply downgrade the problem: why did neoclassical synthesis 
enter the mainstream so quickly and get to dominate the economic scene in post-
war America?  How can we explain the lasting success of critical political 
economics in Great Britain, or the choice of introspection as methodological 
criterion for the Austrian school and its consequent distrust of econometric 
models?  
 My efforts will therefore be addressed to attempting to place the history of 
economics in the wider context of the evolution of Western thought and culture in 
the last century.  More specifically I will try to analyze its links with contemporary 
epistemology and to identify the conscious or subconscious influences and 
conditionings deriving from it.  This is an operation that has often been proposed 
in economics, and it shows quite clearly how the structure of economic science has 
been modeled on study of the natural sciences (Pheby 1988).   Economic history, 
on the contrary, seems to be less sensitive to the problem, even if some time ago, 
                                                  
14 Significant in this regard are the considerations made by William Parker in the opening speech of the 1970 meeting 
of the Economic History Association: «We have really very little experience outside the south with societies that are 
class structured in any obvious and fundamental way – class structured as a matter of theory and principle as well as 
of practice. So we tend to think that social classes are a devilish invention of Marx. We have really no intuitive grasp 
of why backward societies are backward, why defeated people are defeated, why people torn by social antagonism are 
so torn … “»(Parker 1971: 13-14). 
15 The obvious reference is to the work of Toutain (1961, 1965) and Marczewsky (1961a, 1961b, 1965). They raised 
an intense debate that saw Marxist historians and “Annalistes” arrayed on opposite sides. Cfr. for example, Vilar 1965, 
Mandrou 1962, Le Roy Ladurie 1968, Chaunu 1964 and 1968, Furet 1971. 
16  However according to Richard Tilly the situation of historical economics in Germany has been improving, (Tilly 
2001). 
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while the controversy between cliometricians and traditionalists was raging, some 
important words were written about it (McClelland 1975).  It is not very surprising, 
however.  Where the conviction has grown that economic history should, as it 
were, fall under the rules of the ‘more scientific’ economics, questions of an 
epistemological and methodological nature have often tended to overlap economic 
ones.  This is the case of cliometrics, with its ample and explicit recourse to 
economic theory, not only to establish causes between determined initial conditions 
and the historical event under scrutiny, but also to offer an exercise ground for the 
application of sophisticated theoretical models17.   
On the other side, those who consider economic history to be no more than 
a single, if important, aspect of a general, all-embracing history, and who believe in 
the uniqueness of a historic event, do not even ask themselves whether there is an 
analogy  with economics, not to mention with the natural sciences. Which means 
that they too would be likely to end by denigrating any attempt to go deeper into 
the epistemological bases of economic history. These are the two extreme 
positions, however, and between them lies a wide range of combinations between 
history and economic theory, or between history and the social sciences, including 
in particular  the position of those who claim the need for an autonomous 
methodological ‘charter’ of economic history, including its own independent 
theorizations18.  As I see it then, the decades-long debate between the various 
branches of the discipline can only benefit from epistemological openings.  
Let us now try to connect the evolution the discipline underwent before and 
after the Second World War to the philosophical and cultural context of the age, 
when two different streams of thought became two opposing schools.  A 
comparison with what happened in that context looks promising as a line of 
investigation. The new institutions and innovative research proposals coming from 
the world of Anglo-Saxon economic history, and in particular from the States, seem 
to fit perfectly into the climate of scientific rigor and discovery of objective analytic 
instruments that was taking hold. The new impetus also came from the drive given 
by different but converging philosophical trends, logical empiricism and language 
analysis. On the contrary, it can be claimed that the survival in much of western 
Europe of a ‘humanistic’ approach to history, including economic history (that is an 
approach in which narration and subjective interpretation enhance the pure analysis 
of the facts) may well reflect a widespread ‘anti-economic’ non-rationalistic ethos. 
Above all it is an obvious feedback from what Dilthey called the sciences of the 
spirit - the humanistic disciplines - and with the ‘critical’ philosophical and cultural 
                                                  
17 As is implicit for example in McCloskey 1985. Solow’s observations are revealing here (1985: 330): «As I inspect 
current work in economic history, I have the sinking feeling that a lot of it looks exactly like the kind of economic 
analysis I have just finished caricaturing: the same integrals, the same regressions, the same substitution of t-ratios for 
thought . Apart from anything else there is no fun reading the stuff any more. Far from offering the economic 
theorist a widened range of perceptions, this sort of economic history gives back to the theorist the same routine 
gruel that the economic theorist gives to the historian.» 
18 I have already discussed these issues in Toninelli 1987 and 1997. 
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climate in which the main branches of continental philosophy converge: 
phenomenology,  hermeneutics, the Frankfurt school, etc.19 
 I mean to say that, with all due caution, the contrast that has developed in 
the last fifty years between US and, partially (as we will see),  British economic 
history and that of old Europe highlights the difference, however superficially, 
between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy or, better, between 
‘analytic style’ and ‘continental style’(D' Agostini’s 1997:16), thus meaningfully 
encapsulating the difference between the two approaches in contemporary culture. 
It simultaneously evokes and embraces the antithesis between scientific culture and 
humanistic culture, between logic and rhetoric, between analysis and interpretation, 
between clarifying concepts and working out ‘visions of the world’ (Preti 1968, 
Wallerstein 1997).  
The contrast between the two styles is to be seen as a useful but necessarily 
rough classification: on account of its clear-cut and comprehensive character all the 
schools and lines of enquiry can be classified accordingly. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that  for more than one author, such a rigid scheme has in 
recent years been partly overtaken by the facts: divergences have dwindled, 
conceptual barriers have broken down and a dialogue has got underway (Dummet 
1997, 2001).  The same might be said for economic history, as we will see, but the 
fact remains that in order to trace the origins and developments of the two main 
lines of research, such a taxonomy is a useful heuristic instrument.  
  A quite recent synthetic account of the different styles of writing and 
reasoning that separate the analytic from the continental helps in enlightening the 
respective essences of the two methodologies, American economic history and the 
continental variant:   
 
«…the first type of philosophy [the analytic one] has the following characteristics:  
- it makes use of formalisms and specialized language; it demands checkable reasoning at 
every point, so that it tends to deal with somewhat circumscribed issues;  
- it has a prevalently conceptual or thematic slant and does not deal so much with authors 
or texts as with concepts and problems.   
The second [the continental style]:  
- excludes the use of specialized language, makes use of reasoning that is not always 
exactly reconstructable;  
- has a prevalently historical or textual slant, makes reference to authors, texts, particular 
moments in the history of thought, to great historical and conceptual units (ontology 
                                                  
19 A partial exception is represented by the Scandinavian countries and Poland, where positivism and neo-empirism 
can boast a deep-rooted tradition. It is no coincidence that in these countries even economic history has followed a 
different course from the continental one, being more similar in many aspects to the Anglo-Saxon analytical 
approach. Think for example in the case of Sweden of the studies on mercantilism by Eli Hecksher, and above all his 
methodological contribution to a closer link between theory and history, and a wider use of quantitative instruments 
(Hecksher 1929, 1939), and in the case of Poland, of the studies on the economic theory of the feudal system, and 
the methodological contributions of Witold Kula (1970, 1972). 
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before or after Plato; the vicissitudes of modernity; rationalization in the modern age, 
etc.)»  (D’Agostini 1997:58).  
 
  Let us try to make some small substitutions in the text, above all with 
reference to typically philosophical themes: to say, instead of authors or texts, the 
protagonists - men and their enterprises - of economic experience in the past (e.g. 
«Colbert’s economic policy» or «Ford’s multinational activity»).  Instead of 
«ontology before or after Plato» let us insert «the first and second industrial 
revolution in Europe».  What can escape no one with even a smattering of the 
thematic and methodologies adopted by the two ‘schools’ of economic history is 
the amazing similarity with the developments of philosophy just recalled 
           In synthesis (and carrying matters to extremes) the two methodologies of 
economic history can be compared and contrasted for some key elements.  The 
first, the ‘analytic one’ from across the Atlantic, for the problem-solving approach, 
the conceptual slant (hence its links to economic theory), the employment of a 
specialized language (hence the frequent use of econometric and statistical 
techniques).  The American cliometric school has represented it paradigmatically:  
to use Robert Fogel’s words, it has set out «to transform economic history from a 
theory based on implicit, weakly specified and untested theories to one based on 
rigorously specified and empirically warranted theories».  Further on in the same 
essay the 1993 Nobel Prize winner maintains that economic historians «must 
search ... for constructs which, while simple, are nevertheless capable of describing 
the realities with which they are concerned».  In fact «simple models contain few 
parameters and are therefore ‘efficient’ with respect to the available data» (Fogel 
1967:  297-8).  Analogy with the ‘analytic style’ is thus reinforced where these last 
considerations are concerned:  «Trust in schematization or at least in the 
establishment of some kind of theoretic model remains a typical requirement of 
the analytic style, and a crucial element in distinguishing it from the continental 
style» (D’Agostini 1997:  211). 
            Conversely the key aspects of the other current in economic history -   
‘continental economic history’ - can be introduced precisely by the distrust in the 
above-mentioned schematization.  Since several schools come under that heading, 
however, it is more difficult to identify common connotations, though there would 
seem to be some basic features present in the most representative contributions of 
each of them, with a different specific weight from case to case:  holistic approach, 
narrative language, chronological slant, interpretative tension.  For example  within 
the Marxist tradition, the already mentioned Dobb’s volume was  emblematic of 
such an approach, as well as later on Eric Hobsbawm’s main contributions would 
have been.  Even more representative were the methodological positions taken first 
by Lucien Febvre in the Annales school, then by Fernand Braudel in his studies on 
the longue durée and world economy.  For Febvre, «histoire totalitarian is expressed as a 
cognitive synthesis of all the social aspects carried out in ‘experimental’ form, that 
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is by integrating various disciplinary points of view, according to the idea that 
science must reproduce as indeterminate a character as society does».  For Braudel, 
instead, «globality is more of a fringe idea that is expressed as an appropriation 
process by historians of the methods and techniques of fringe disciplines» (Gemelli 
1987:  17).  
An entire generation of historians and social scientists would have grown under 
the combined influence of Marxism and the French school, which reached also the 
other side of the Atlantic: great personalities such as Paul Bairoch, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Jurgen Kocka and Giovanni Arrighi have been addressing historical 
matters with a broad comparative approach and a strong sensitivity for social and 
environmental issues. They have greatly contributed to nowadays blooming interest 
for world history and/or global history. 
 
 
4.  Economic History and Economic Theory 
 
  A brief reference has already been made to the connective function between 
the two sides of the Ocean exerted by British economic history. As a matter of fact 
the British soil was fertile and well suited to the American seeds. Its long-standing 
tradition in economics strongly contributed to the development after WW2 of an 
empirically well sounded and conceptually solid school of economic history in 
which stand out authors  such as, e.g.,  Alec Caincross, Brinley Thomas,  Phillys 
Deane,  H.J. Habbakuk and Ronald Hartwell (Feinstein 2003). In the same climate 
was educated Angus Maddison, a former outstanding professional economist and 
OECD consultant, who for some time has been producing valuable comparative 
historical growth accounts, largely used both by economist and economic 
historians. 
Yet, simply bracketing British and American economic history together, 
particularly during the rise of cliometrics, would be misleading. There is quite a 
disparity between the strongly analytic American model and the weaker British one. 
This – once again – has interesting epistemological analogies and can be partly 
explained by differences in the analytic styles of the two schools. Recalling the 
previous schematization, the differing elements refer exclusively to the first point:  
the use of formalisms, specialized language and reasoning that can be checked at 
every point. What the two schools have in common, instead, is an essentially 
problem-solving conceptual slant. Within the analytic current a contrast  emerged 
in the Thirties   between the mainly American logical-neopositivistic component 
and the more properly analytic one diffused above all in England. In the Fifties this 
developed in the contrast between two types of language: ideal  language in 
America, and ordinary language in the United Kingdom..  The first type of analysis 
aims to purify and clarify the language, «relating it to (or translating it into) a formal 
and regimented language, that is a language whose logical form and procedures are 
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controllable, clear and defined».  On the contrary, the various currents that make 
up the analysis of language in Britain reveal themselves «somewhat averse to 
formalization and the use of formal procedures for the analysis and clarification of 
the natural language, since for ( … ) them the essentially interactive communicative 
nature of the language seems ( … ) to advise against this kind of procedure.» 
(D’Agostini 1997:  216-17).   
Perhaps it is no more than a problem of language that seems to divide - 
within the analytic kind of economic history - the American school, in search of a 
‘pure’ analytic language and the British one, more reluctant to formalize20. This 
problem emerges clearly when reading what I consider one of the most important 
contributions of British economic historiography, American and British Technology in 
the Nineteenth Century by H.J. Habakkuk (1962) and of the decades-long debate that 
followed its publication. It was a debate that involved some of the most passionate 
exponents of cliometric history.  This is not the place to enter the fray, however. 
What interests us here concerns the methodological aspects. In a 1997 interview 
Habakkuk clearly alludes to the differences between the economic languages of the 
U.K. and the U.S when he says: 
   
«The most influential economists [of Cambridge economics in the period when it 
influenced me] were not interested in large-scale empirical research on the National 
Bureau model. ...  They concerned themselves with a relatively limited range of 
established facts, and devoted a considerable amount of intellectual effort to discovering 
and analyzing why on this basis the system worked as it did. ... And also there ... [was] an 
absence of the formal statements of propositions and then the statistical proof of their 
truth» (Habakkuk 1997:29-30).   
 
Indeed, in his attempt to re-read the different technological development in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, Habakkuk explicitly refers to «the 
union between history and theory» as something fruitful, especially with regard to 
«those parts of  theory» that he considers relevant for the case under scrutiny21.  
Hence the heterodox approach that characterizes his text, where the neoclassical 
accents are tempered by a robust presentation with classical and Keynesian 
echoes22. But precisely from here moves the attack made by the ‘new’ American 
economic historians, who criticized him for not having specified his conceptual 
model sufficiently, so that it lacked analyticity and prevented the adoption of a 
formalized language capable of leading to precise and definitive measurements.  So 
it was  that Peter Temin, taking into consideration only the part of Habakkuk’s 
                                                  
20 Hence also a lesser reliance on technicalities as shown by the following statement by R. M. Hartwell (2001: 8) 
when saying that technique “can also be a dangerous tool for the unwary. History should always determine 
technique, but too often the use of technique limits history”. 
21 More specifically, as he will write later on (Habakkuk 1971: 320), theory should be used «to suggest hypotheses, 
pose questions, offer clues, and provide a test of logical consistency». 
22 «The intellectual habits which my Labour Scarcity essays betray are much more those of Cambridge economics 
than they are of Cambridge history» (Habakkuk 1997: 30). 
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reasoning that can be formalized in neoclassical language (thus omitting the 
dynamic aspects connected with technological change), reached opposite 
conclusions to Habakkuk, namely that labor costs were lower in the United States 
then in the United Kingdom: but these conclusions  contradict all the documentary 
evidence on the subject.  However Temin, instead of renouncing his ‘language’, 
rejected the British historian’s theses (Temin 1966, but see also Fogel 1967, Temin 
1971, David 1975: 19-91).   
This digression on the Habakkuk debate takes us back to the question of the 
relationship between economic theory and economic history, a question that for 
reasons already given surfaces above all within the stream of analytic economic 
history.  It seems to be a long-accepted fact that economics can often provide 
history with decisive input in its attempt to explain past economic events, as 
shown by the quotations of Kuznets, Habakkuk and Sutch already recorded in this 
text.   
The problem seems to be much more complicated and, all things considered, 
unresolved where the continental stream is concerned. Notwithstanding Braudel’s 
sensitive approach to economics, the subject is placed by the Annales school on the 
same level as the other human sciences (anthropology, sociology, psychology etc.), 
which find their ideal laboratory in global history. In the Marxist school, on the 
contrary, it is clear that the relationship is enhanced by infusing it with social, 
political and ideological significance, properly defined by the term ‘vision of the 
world’.  
  It is therefore only in the ‘analytic area’ where a tentative schematic 
subdivision of tasks into economic history and economics is taking shape.  Though 
sharing the same nature, the two subjects differ in so far as the basic function of 
economic history is seen as explanation while the basic objective of economics is 
prediction (Friedman 1953). A grasp of the single problems provides all the 
elements, essential pieces to explain how the dynamics of socio-economic systems 
evolved through the ages, before and after the birth of the present, capitalist 
system.  
As already mentioned, the nineteen forties represented a crucial turning 
point  where the change of attitude towards economic theory was concerned.  At 
the same time intense stimuli were being felt for closer co-operation between 
economic history and economic theory in the field of methodology also. The merit 
for this goes especially to Carl Gustav Hempel, a German philosopher, member of 
the Berlin circle and in close contact with the Vienna circle, i.e. the two founder 
groups of the logical empiricism current that went on to merge with the analytic 
one.  Moving to the United States, where he taught at Princeton and Pittsburgh, 
Hempel published, among other things, various highly relevant methodological 
contributions to the social sciences.  In particular, in his seminal essay of 1942, The 
Function of General Laws in History, he declared the principle of the «methodological 
unity of empirical science», from which he derived «the necessity in historical 
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research to make extensive use of universal hypotheses of which at least the 
overwhelming majority come from fields of research traditionally distinguished 
from history» (Hempel 1942:  48). The ‘different fields’ must therefore resort to 
their corresponding sciences, and ask them for the necessary laws to explain events 
- economic history, in particular, should turn to economic science.  In the original 
1942 version, Hempel, though admitting it was possible «to construe certain 
explanations offered in history as based on the assumptions of probability 
hypotheses» (p. 41), actually ended up identifying those laws (covering laws) with the 
universal generalizations typical of a nomological-deductive explanation. This 
model proceeds by deduction from universal (and deterministic) laws, comparable 
to natural law, valid everywhere and at all times.   
Following Hempel’s theory, the central problem for the economic historian 
thus became which part of economic theory to choose, or which laws were suitable 
to explain the subject in question. The answer arrived with the rationalist, 
‘scientific’ shift that had characterized the American economy since the Thirties 
(McCloskey 1985). Coinciding with the spreading of the ‘analytic style’ as a result 
of immigration into the country of some of the leading representatives of the 
European neo-positivist circles, the dominant institutionalist and pragmatic 
tradition was rapidly overshadowed by the impact of the marginalist-neoclassical 
current. This is known to have been involved from Walras onwards in the search 
for and purely theoretic demonstration of the existence of the ‘mythical’ general 
economic equilibrium, beyond any historically determined context.  The economic 
models getting their cue from it are, however, constructed on axioms and 
postulates that take on the form of abstract, universal, theoretic assumptions. They 
have long dominated the mainstream of theoretic economics, finding an 
emblematic epistemological clarification in Friedman’s famous essay of 1953, in 
which economics was seen as an objective science on a par with classical physics 
(Pheby 1988).  
There is no doubt that for the first generation of cliometric historians the 
most relevant historical theory was the neo-classical one, with its static models 
focused on the function of production, capable of tackling an essentially micro-
economic topic (Toninelli 1987). Conversely, the other line of research was kept in 
the shade for a long time, in spite of its strong impact on both practice and 
Keynesian and post-Keynesian theory, which in its original, Cambridge school 
version, was completely ignored23 . This latter way of reasoning was more in line 
with British philosophy and language, another nursling of Cambridge (where 
Bertrand Russell lectured up to 1918 and Ludwig Wittgenstein taught in the 
Thirties and Forties)24.  
                                                  
23 But see Jeffrey Williamson’s observations in this regard (1979: 251-3). 
24 The epistemological approach underlying this kind of model is of the inductive probabilistic kind that draws 
inspiration from the experimental sciences from Bacon onwards. Through it one proceeds by trial and error and 
mutual feedback in search of probabilistic generalizations and valid rules inside a determined historical and temporal 
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5. Economic history and business history 
 
From the late Fifties, therefore, the neo-classic analytic model made a growing 
impact on American economic history, and cliometrics was to become increasingly 
identified with it.    
However, the conquest of the discipline was quite controversial: since the 
beginning the «Harvard wing» of cliometrics, formed primarily by Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s disciples,  appeared quite skeptical of the excessive reliance on the 
neoclassical price theory25. Most importantly this position would have soon been 
endorsed by one of the most authoritative founders of the new school, Douglass 
North (1981, 1990) who, dissatisfied with the increasing reductionism of history to 
equilibrium models, was exploring a new approach which revitalized the role of 
institutions, somehow reverting to the origins of the discipline, i.e. the old historical 
school (Freeman & Louça 2002: 16-20).  
Besides,  in 1971 the growing dissatisfaction of business historians towards 
what was becoming the dominant paradigm in economic history led to quite a 
dramatic break between the two disciplines26. From the late Forties the   
problematic cohabitation between economic history and business history seemed to 
have found a modus vivendi: under Schumpeter’s influence, the bunch of young 
scholars associated with the  Harvard’s Center for Research in Entrepreneurial 
History tried to bridge the gap between the two disciplines and laid down the 
foundations of what was to become the dominant paradigm of business history: 
Chandler’s organizational synthesis (Galambos 2003; Hausman 2003). By 
emphasizing structure vs. agents such an approach appeared in se congruous with 
the Anglo-American conceptual modeling,  even if in the light of the mentioned 
subsequent partition this can sound almost a paradox.  
As a matter of fact also with regard to the evolution of entrepreneurial history 
quite a clear dichotomy emerges, which emphasizes on the one side, the Anglo-
Saxon, the centrality of the firm and on the other, the Old Continental, the role of 
the entrepreneur. Once more different epistemological backgrounds  are likely to 
explain  the diverging conceptualizations that lied behind the two traditions of 
research (Toninelli 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                       
context. In the Sixties Hempel himself, correcting his initial position, would come to admit the usefulness of such an 
approach in explaining history (Hempel 1965) 
25 Of course I am not discussing here of the primary controversy, the one which opposed cliometricians to 
“traditional” (institutionalist) economic historians: the latter included other distinguished Harvard professors, such as 
Fritz Redlich and David Landes. 
 
26 In spite of the opposition of Alfred Chandler, who did not want  to abandon the Economic History Association 
to the cliometricians,  in that year the Business History Conference was transformed into the formal organization of 
professional business historians fleeing the EHA (Chandler, 2004) 
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In the classical economics – from Smith to Marx – the entrepreneur was hardly 
mentioned, if mentioned at all. Production and the investment of capital was 
regarded as a sort of an automatic process, which involved no critical decision-
making, no risky judgment  or imagination of any kind . In this tradition capitalist 
was the only term which seemed to appeal the scholar. On the continent , instead, a 
long-standing tradition going back to the late medieval and early Renaissance Italy, 
as well as to Minorities Economics and the late Scholastic thought , pointed at 
periculum  (risk and uncertainty) as the fundamental element which legitimated 
merchant (business) profits. Not by chance it was a French contemporary of Smith, 
Richard Cantillon, who introduced the term entrepreneur, only much later   
popularized by J.S. Mill among British economists (1848). And Mill however failed 
to break the Smith-Ricardo tradition of the entrepreneur as simply a ‘multifaceted 
capitalist’ (Blaug 2000: 80).  
Theoretical attitude would not change much, but for a few major exceptions27, 
in the next century. With regard to the continental side, on the one hand the 
Austrian Economic School coherently developed a line of research that emphasizes 
individual action and hence deliberately  appreciates the role of the entrepreneur 
(Kirzner 1973); on the other,  social scientists/economists like, again, Weber and 
Sombart  produced major efforts to offer typologies and/or taxonomies of all the 
characters acting in the economy, therefore comprehensive of entrepreneurs.  As 
for the analytic front, within the neo-classic static modelling entrepreneurship kept 
on being considered  an useless false glitter or, at most, a residual –  i.e. the elusive 
world where the growth accounting theory  quarantined all that could not be 
explained through its classic analytical tool, how much important it could be. 
However, all over the century institutionalism kept on exerting  its influence on a 
minor but nevertheless not negligible stream of thought. As a consequence a 
growing attention to the firm as an organized institution began to be paid  (Veblen 
1904, Berle & Means 1932, Coase 1937, Penrose 1959): the dynamics of such an 
institution  was to become a major field of research in business history but, as said, 
not sufficient to avoid the split between economic and business history. 
 
6.  The crisis of the neo-empiricist model  
 
A 1991 study on the characteristics of the articles published in the first half 
century of the Journal of Economic History offers some quite impressive results: the 
percentage of rigorously cliometric articles published by the journal grew from 
10.2% of the total from 1946 to 1950; 42.8% from 1966 to 1970; 78.9% of from 
1976 to 1980 and finally to a maximum of 80.5% from 1985 to 1990 (Whaples 
1991): no need to say that the greatest part was based on neoclassic theorizing and 
modelling. The heyday  of the neoclassic-based economic history corresponded to 
                                                  
27 Such as e.g. Marshall (1890) and Knight (1921) 
  17 
the moment of the largest gap and the strongest dichotomy between the analytical 
and the continental schools.  
Therefore the belief in Hempel’s covering laws and in the heuristic capabilities of 
explanatory models based on the natural sciences and positivistic logic remained 
unchallenged for a long time across the Atlantic. But the social disciplines, being 
younger than the scientific ones, are exposed to the risk of subordination to them. 
Therefore any analogical transposition of physical science models into social 
science  would result in the well-known tension between theoretic models and 
historical reality: a tension sparked off by concepts that until a few decades ago 
were the very nucleus of science - equilibrium, determinism and reversibility - with 
accidental, unbalancing factors pushed into the background.   
For some time, however, even in American analytic circles, some critical 
reflections have emerged with regard to two basic dogmas of the ‘scientific view of 
the world’ associated with Carnap: separation in the cognitive process between 
subject and object and the fragmentation of experimental facts. It is a belief that 
was confirmed even in front of the  aims of going beyond the neo-positivist 
epistemology as exerted in the Sixties by Kuhn, Lakatos and Fayerabend (and even 
earlier by Popper). Here, to some extent, even  irrational elements seem to have 
wedged themselves into the rational foundations of scientific doctrines.  Nor can 
we ignore the fact that more or less simultaneously, in the British analytic camp, the 
‘post-empiricist’ epistemological shift was maturing. This shift radically questioned 
the dichotomy between human sciences and natural science, given that such a 
dichotomy presupposed an empiricist vision of natural science almost universally 
discredited. The very language of the natural sciences is irreducibly metaphorical 
and inexact, and can be formalized only by distorting the dynamics of its historical 
development (Hesse 1980: 171-3) [Actually, we can note in this shift the premises 
for an end to the dichotomy between analytic style and continental style that has up 
to this point acted as guideline to this paper]. Indeed, rather than discuss the 
differences between the two epistemologies, the latest scientific-philosophical 
developments seem to indicate they have been overcome, through the discovery of 
a new epistemology based on a possible ‘new alliance’ between natural science and 
human sciences (Prigogine - Stengers 1979) as would appear to be taking place in 
the sciences of complexity (Toninelli 1987).   
It is a new alliance which the old continent’s social sciences have also been 
urged to take into account  - thus including the various streams of economic 
history.  At the outset  of the new millennium the complexity challenge has no 
geographical, sectorial or disciplinary boundaries; on the contrary, its transversality 
is its characterizing trait. (See e.g. Prigogine et al. 1986, Nicolis - Progine 1991, 
Morin 1993, Bocchi-Ceruti 1985).  Certainly the continental school, less 
conditioned by the epistemological neo-empiricist model, seems an easier path to 
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follow28.  In fact on the side of "hard" science and the theories aspiring to it (in 
which I would include general economic equilibrium, thus cliometrics too) this 
possible coming together of different fields of knowledge demands some hitherto 
unimaginable sacrifices - the reversibility principle, for instance - and the 
acceptance of time and space variables as constitutive parts of analysis.  However, 
even the "weak" human sciences - in which I would also include continental 
economic history - are obliged to make a quantum leap:  thus both to ask 
themselves the question of conceptualization and theory (as humanist scholars par 
excellence, such as literary and art historians, have been trying to do for some time) 
and to realize that "complexity" is something different, more difficult to grasp, than 
"totality".  Besides, the Sixties and Seventies were years of great reflection and 
enrichment also for the continental philosophical schools, and this has had 
important effects on the various streams of continental economic history as well.  
In this respect we only have to think of the changes that have occurred in the 
Annales school, the developments of the so-called “third generation" and the 
influence exerted on it by Levi-Strauss and Foucault in the heyday of French 
structuralism 
The epistemological developments of the nineteen sixties and seventies have 
not been entirely ignored by economic theory, even inside the mainstream 
identifiable in the several schools deriving from the marginalist-neoclassical current 
(Barrotta-Raffaelli 1998).  If in some heterodox currents, criticism of the 
epistemological approach inspired by the physical sciences comes slightly after the 
crisis of the neo-empiricist paradigm (see f.e. Georgescu-Rogen 1971, 1976), 
towards the middle of the Eighties even Robert Solow, one of the leading 
proponents of ‘pure’ economics, on the occasion of a meeting of the American 
Economic Association, somewhat unwillingly agreed that «one will have to 
recognize that the validity of an economic model may depend on the social 
context» (Solow 1985:331).  Certainly more provocative for its strong 
Fayerabendian echoes was the essay published in 1985 by D. McCloskey 
(McCloskey 1985, but see also McCloskey 2001): an outright manifesto against the 
positive economics method, written no less by a representative of the Chicago 
school who for years, by his own admission, had fought in the ‘positivist brigade’.  
Reacting to the excesses of positivism, this appeal in defense of rhetoric in 
economics and economic history can also be read as an attempt to bridge the gap 
between analytic style and continental style in the two disciplines. But, generally 
speaking economic theory appears today more diversified and pluralistic. As noted 
by Avner Greif (1997, p.401), «theoretical developments and empirical evidence led 
both micro- and macroeconomic theory to recognize the futility of seeking a single 
                                                  
28 In this regard one has to agree with Immanuel Wallerstein when he says that “the conceptual picture offered by 
complex evolutionary systems, as developed by the natural sciences, presents the social sciences with a coherent set 
of ideas that goes well with visions long present among the social sciences, particularly among those that have 
resisted the forms of nomothetic analysis inspired by the science of linear equilibria” (Wallerstein 1997: 59). 
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universally applicable economic model». While institutions, asymmetric 
information, bounded rationality, multiple equilibria represent new formidable 
challenges for the theorist, even among mainstream economists there is less 
consensus about the very nature of economic laws (Demeulemeester-Diebolt, 
2007). 
Indeed, the American scene appears more diversified today even where 
economic history is concerned. The most novel changes come from the history of 
technology, where for some time the contributions of Nathan Rosenberg (1976, 
1982, 1994) and Paul David (1985,1992, 2007) have been directed towards a 
‘strategic repositioning’ of time and space variables, so as to restore dynamicity to 
the studies of historical topics. Innovations in a pure Schumpeterian spirit are 
significant here (Freeman-Louça 2002).  To the concepts of technological 
convergence, learning by doing and path-dependence - developed by the two 
authors and now become common property for the discipline - can be added that 
of ‘punctuated equilibria’ imported from the sciences of complexity in the analysis 
of technological change (Mokyr 1990).  This concept attempts to reconcile 
continuity and discontinuity in the processes of technological (and economic) 
transformation, reinterpreting in an original way the models of modern 
evolutionary macro-biology in which phases of gradual, sequential and adaptive 
evolution (Darwinian, therefore) are punctuated with profound changes 
(bifurcations generating new species).  Apart from epistemological analogy, such 
studies in my opinion run along the lines of that minor but most meaningful 
research for the future of the discipline, which has always striven to find an 
autonomous set of methodological rules for economic history, that is a set of rules 
that would reconcile the requirements of deep conceptual study with historical 
explanation, and thus walk the tightrope between history and economics, proposing 
models and original generalizations ‘typical’ of economic history. Alexander 
Gerschenkron, Walt Rostow, Ronald Hartwell and H.J.Habbakuk contributed in 
the past to the development of the discipline along this line. Today, apart from the 
authors of the Schumpeterian tradition, also the economic historians of the neo-
institutional school can be located within this perspective. 
Yet something seems to be moving on the ‘hard’ economic history front, too.  
In the very periodical that has long been the standard-bearer of cliometrics - the 
Journal - as I have said, the last fifteen years saw a few contributions by authoritative 
representatives of cliometrics, favorable to ‘humanistic’ openings in American 
economic history.  For example, in the essay already cited, Sutch places as a future 
objective of the discipline that of integrating economic history back into the 
discipline of history (Sutch 1991:277-8). On his part, in his opening address to the 
1996 meeting of the Economic History Association, with the intriguing title ‘Is it 
kosher to talk about culture?’ (Temin 1997), Peter Temin recognizes that the 
different cultures had a determining role in forging the different way the Anglo-
Saxon countries approached industrialization compared with Japan. He 
  20 
recommends therefore that both economists and economic historians should 
devote more attention to the cultural aspects in their analyses of economic 
development29. These range from McCloskey' s (1998) plea for encompassing "S 
variables" in economic (history) analysis to Wright' s (1999) questioning about the 
Civil Rights Revolution as an economic revolution for the South; from Neal' s 
(2000) proposal to address economic history research more to shocks than normal 
change, to Goldin' s (2001) emphasis on vices and virtues of the US process of 
human capital formation. 
 Besides, at a more general level, a number of methodological contributions 
reflecting on the nature and the boundaries of the discipline tend to suggest the 
viability of a more eclectic approach able not only to bridge the divide between 
history and economics but also to transform economic history into «a cure for 
economics» (see e.g. Greif 1997 and 2006; North 1997; North-Wallis-Reingast   
2006; Wright 2001 and 2006).  
Finally a timid re-approaching between economic history and business history 
seems to go on, although the researchers really working on both fronts are still 
quite few. However it should not be underrated the fact that  the NBER is on the 
front line in pursuing this interdisciplinary effort and that «…recent developments 
in economic theory provide a historic opportunity for greater communication» 
between  the two fields (Lamoreaux et al., 1999: 5). 
 
7.  Academic economics and sociology matters 
It would be misleading to link the explanation of the different paths followed 
by economic history on the two sides of the Atlantic, as well as recent changing 
attitudes in the US, exclusively to S factors (stretching McCloskey' s language to 
encompass cultural and philosophical aspects in S).  As I have said, issues 
concerning academic sociology and economics most probably lie behind   
theoretical and epistemological issues – above all where the academic chair market 
is concerned.  This emerges quite clearly from most interviews given by 
outstanding exponents of the discipline and published in recent years in that 
mouthpiece of economic historians, The Newsletter of the Cliometric Society.  According 
to them, in comparison with the greater dynamism of a university system like the 
American one, open to market forces and private financing, and ready to embrace 
novelty, is counterpoised the sluggishness of continental universities, mainly 
public, where the rigidity of the curricula and academic careers tend to perpetuate 
consolidated traditions of research (Temin 1999:42-4; David, 1999:  25-7; Ransom 
2000:10-2; Engerman 2000:7-8; Williamson 2000; Hartwell 2001:9; McCloskey 
                                                  
29 In a recent interview Temin carries his point even further: «I would say that the mid Seventies may be the high 
point of, let’s call it, pure econometrics, in the sense that all you needed to know was the economic theory and that, 
if you just understood the competitive model, you could deal with any problem at all. I think that since then there 
has been somewhat of a retreat from this … It was not a decline in the use of economic models and evidence, but 
rather it was erosion of the belief that these were the only kinds of evidence that were relevant. It was the beginning 
of a notion that it’s not Us and Them, but maybe that it’s together that we need to do this» (Temin 1999: 41). 
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2001:9-10; Sutch 2001:10; Rockoff: 2003,9).  Sam Williamson has something 
significant to say about this when he recalls how, just before the ‘cliometric 
revolution’, economy theory itself was rapidly replacing economic institutionalism, 
which had been dominant until then. A consequence not to be overlooked was 
that «traditional economic history was regarded as one of the most non-rigorous 
parts of the field, and was being dropped from many graduate departments» 
(Williamson 1991:21).  With their readiness to enter into dialogue with economists, 
whose stress was on a more rigorous analysis based on theory and who were able 
to set up of wide-ranging researches, cliometricians were immediately able to 
answer the needs of the economy departments. Besides, starting from 1958, they 
had shown their versatility in using  the computer (Hughes-Reiter 1998), an 
innovation that had soon won the attention of  scholars in America, even outside 
rigorously scientific fields of research.  So it was that from the late Sixties onwards, 
the ‘new’ economic historians were easily able to find employment in rapidly 
expanding economics departments.  In the Seventies, while ‘a terrible depression’ 
fell on career possibilities for young researchers with traditional post-graduate 
specialization in history, demand for cliometric historians remained high, with the 
result that they got the lion's share of new appointments, quickly obtaining tenure 
(on average two years ahead of other historians - Fogel 1996:7). Academic success 
was accompanied by success in obtaining public and private financing both for 
research programs with a strong quantitative stamp, and for congresses and 
seminars.  
For a few years, on the contrary, some signs of tiredness and disillusion have 
begun to appear also where ‘academic’ success is concerned30.  In his 
reconstruction of the history of cliometrics, Williamson recalls the high costs the 
discipline had to bear in order to be accepted in economics departments and to be 
able to share the same status as other branches of applied economics. The most 
serious of these costs came from considering cliometrics nothing more than a new 
branch of applied economics.  For Williamson this comparison meant that since 
for a cliometric ‘when it comes time for promotion and tenure, the rest of an 
economics department may not appreciate the difficulties of working in the 
archives, or for that matter even working in the library, the cliometrician's work is 
judged on the basis of what the rest of the department knows - the theory and 
quantitative tests used’ (Williamson 1991:26) This has at times led new historians to 
publish works capable of competing with their economist colleagues but deficient 
in historical grounding. Instead, for Williamson, a cliometrician’s ability should be 
evaluated on the basis of his knowledge of the instruments and methods of history, 
                                                  
30 According to Temin, «the market for economic historians has not been a particularly buoyant one in recent years. 
There is a steady demand for economic historians but, while the demand for economists has been growing, the 
demand for economic historians has been pretty stagnant, with one or two economic historians at each school and, 
in fact, we like economic historians who can also teach money and banking or macro or labor or econometrics or 
whatever. And so it has been hard to attract people into economic history as a professional activity» (Temin 1999: 
43) 
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  This long parenthesis devoted to cliometrics, and the epistemological 
model that inspired it, has necessarily overshadowed the contrast between analytic 
style and continental style that was the guideline in the first part of the paper.  Yet 
it can be justified by the fact that, as I have tried to demonstrate so far, this line of 
study can not only be identified as the paradigmatic transposition into the 
discipline of the analytic style but also because it can at least be given the merit of 
having raised extremely important methodological questions. Perhaps not always 
accepted (or understood), they have at least set in motion a process of critical 
reflection inside the whole of economic history.   
  It is also true that, as I have already underlined, the discussion concerning 
method, especially when carried on beyond the borders of the North American 
continent, has taken on tones of a clash and rigid opposition rather than a dialogue 
and comparison.  It is also true that to a large extent such rigidity can be ascribed 
to the sectarianism and aggressiveness of the ‘new’ economic historians, who as 
Fogel himself recognizes ex post,  «were young, inexperienced and often did not 
respect the etiquette of scientific debate»31. [It is worth noting how such attitudes 
find a correspondence in ‘certain unpleasant characteristics that tend to thrive in 
analytic circles: scientism, sectarianism and a refusal to contemplate other forms of 
philosophy’ (Marconi 1997:6).]   
It may however be worth pointing out at least a couple of points for further 
study:  first of all the disappearance of what had been on the whole also a 
geographical identification in the opposition between analytic economic history 
and continental economic history. It is without doubt that in various continental 
countries ( Spain and Germany, above all, but also in Italy and France itself) 
important lines of study have recently developed in historical economics that 
might be capable of giving further stimulus to the process of self-awareness set in 
motion by American cliometrics.  
Secondly, as mentioned, since the Seventies an intense phase of rethinking 
and redefining objectives and methods of continental economic (and social) 
history seems to have opened up.  A maturing blend of Marxist and Braudelian 
approaches has fueled a stream of studies of mega-economic history, i.e. of 
economic history  seen as a world process in the long run, in which the long-
prevailing  Euro-centric bias has been challenged by a  novel emphasis on the 
                                                  
31 Fogel 1996:6. In Peter Temin’s words: «…we were St. George and the conventional historians were the dragons, 
and we had to slay them. It was very definitely set up a contest between Us and Them, very much a feeling of Them 
and Us. Other people have talked about the problems with the Journal of economic History and how it was going to 
bridge these cultures. But within the cliometrics meetings, there was no feeling that we had to bridge the cultures: we 
were the true believers» (Temin 1999: 5) 
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development of the rest of the world (O’Brien 2006). Besides, the contemporary 
outburst of globalization and of its related economic and socio-cultural matters has 
attracted a growing interest from a number of dynamic Anglo-American economic 
historians such as Jeffery Williamson, Alan Taylor and Niall Ferguson: the ‘new 
global history’ tries to combine successfully the cliometric methodology with wide-
ranging objectives of social, cultural and political nature.  
It may be impossible to claim for economic history what was claimed for 
historiography in general some time ago, that is, that «mutually fruitful relations» 
now prevail «completely ... over the specific characteristics of the historical culture 
of the single countries» and that «orientations and research methods» in history 
«have ceased to be a national peculiarity» (Rossi 1987: XVIII).  Perhaps, more than 
fertilization and historiographic koiné,  what is projected for economic history, as 
for many other fields of knowledge, from philosophy to economics itself, is a 
cohabitation, a pluralism of methods and many different lines of study, able to 
overcome any rigid epistemological and methodological opposition from within. 
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